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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-
emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations.
In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-
Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient
condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.
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1 Introduction
Consider a setting with several regions (e.g., villages, municipalities, or small districts),
each inhabited by several residents. All these residents are interested in the realization
of the same type of task (e.g., mowing the lawn, cleaning a rain gutter, or pruning the
hedge). Such a task can be executed with a single resource, and each resident may or
may not own such a single resource (e.g., a lawn mower, a gutter ladder, or a hedge
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trimmer). If a resident holds (and so has access to) such a resource, it generates a
resident-specific profit (e.g., the profit or utility realized by mowing the lawn, cleaning
the rain gutter, or pruning the hedge).
Residents amongst, but also within, regions can decide to collaborate. In such a
collaboration, the participants decide in which regions to locate their resources. Each
resource is then shared, and used, amongst all participants in the region where the
resource is located, a so-called covered region. Such type of situations, in which a
resource is shared and used amongst all participants in a covered region, is reasonable
when, for instance, demand per participant is low (e.g., a hedge trimmer is only used
a couple of hours, per year) or capacity of the resource is high. The aim of the
collaborating residents is to (re)allocate the resources in such a way that total profit
(i.e., the sum of the profits of the participating residents that belong to a covered
region), is maximized. Typically, this results in additional profit (compared to the
situation without any collaboration amongst the players) and thus the question arises
about how to allocate this additional profit in a fair and efficient way amongst the
collaborating participants. In this paper, we investigate this joint profit allocation
aspect in a resource location (RL) situation. To tackle this aspect, we introduce a RL
game wherein residents are represented by players that each may or may not own a
single resource and each have an associated profit, indicating the worth of having
access to a resource.
For these RL games, we study properties of the core (i.e., the set of all possible
allocations for which no group of players has an incentive not to collaborate). We
distinguish between the case with more resources than regions (i.e., oversupply) and
the case with not more resources than regions (i.e., no oversupply). For both cases, we
show that the core is non-empty. For the oversupply case, we provide a complete
description of the core. For the no oversupply case, we provide a subset of the core.
We do so by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit (RP)
allocations. These RP allocations are based on a uniform price of owning a resource
and the player-specific profit. In addition, for the no oversupply case, we present a
sufficient condition for which the core and the set of RP allocations coincide. As a side
result, we are able to identify how these RP allocations can be constructed via any
core allocation. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient
condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed, i.e., the set of RP
allocations is a proper subset of the core.
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RL games belong to the class of resource pooling games, in which resources are
reallocated, or shared, amongst players to realize additional profit. In the last couple
of years, there is an increasing interest in these games. Some examples are the pooling
of technicians in the service industry (Anily and Haviv [1]), pooling of capacity in a
production environment (Özen et al. [8], Anily and Haviv [2]), pooling of emergency
vehicles in health care (Karsten et al. [6]), reallocation of inventory in a retail setting
(Sošic´ [12]), pooling of spare parts in the capital intensive goods industry (Karsten
et al. [5], Karsten and Basten [4], Guajardo and Rönnqvist [3]), and reallocation of
spare parts and repair vans in a railway setting (Schlicher et al. [9, 10]). To the best of
our knowledge, there are no resource pooling games in literature that consider our
specific situation –the one in which players can share resources within a region and
reallocate them amongst the regions. The only exception is the classical Böhm-Bawerk
horse market (BBHM) game, which has been studied extensively in literature (see,
e.g., Tejada and Núñez [14], Tejada [13], Núñez and Rafels [7] and Shapley and Shubik
[11]). In BBHM games, there are sellers that each have one horse for sale and buyers
that each wish to buy one such horse. These horses are all alike, while the sellers and
buyers may have different valuations for such a horse. When collaborating, horses are
sold towards those buyers that value horses most. Shapley and Shubik [11] showed
that the core of these games coincide with a particular set of market allocations,
which, per player, depends on its valuation and a uniform market price. Clearly, we
study a generalization of BBHM games: when each region (of an RL game) inhabits
exactly one player (with or without a resource), the players with a resource can be
seen as potential sellers and the players without a resource can be seen as potential
buyers. Hence, in the spirit of BBHM games, we contribute to the literature by
generalizing this classical game and some of its corresponding results.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce RL situations and
describe the associated RL games. Then, in Section 3, we formally define the set of RP
allocations and we analyze its relation with the core of RL games. We conclude this
paper with a final remark about this relation. We want to emphasize that proofs of
lemmas and theorems are relegated to the appendix. For the main results, which are
presented in the form of theorems, we also give a sketch of proof in the main text.
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2 RL situations and associated RL games
We start with introducing RL situations in Section 2.1. Thereafter, to tackle the
allocation problem of the maximal joint profit increase in an RL situation, we describe
the associated RL games in Section 2.2. We conclude this section with an example of
such an RL game.
2.1 RL situation
An RL situation can be summarized by a tuple θ = (N, r, w,D , D), where N ⊆ N is a
finite set of players (e.g., residents). The parameter ri ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether player
i ∈ N owns a resource (ri = 1) or not (ri = 0). The vector r ∈ {0, 1}N summarizes these
parameters. It is assumed that there is at least one player who owns a resource, i.e.,
∑i∈N ri ≥ 1. The player-specific profit wi ≥ 0 specifies the profit player i ∈ N realizes in
case he has access to a resource. A player has access to a resource if he owns a resource.
When players collaborate, there is also another way of having access to a resource,
which will be discussed later on in this section. The vector w ∈ RN++ summarizes the
player-specific profits. The set D ⊆ N is a finite set of regions. Furthermore, Dj ⊆ N
represents the set of players that belong to region j ∈ D . Every player belongs to
exactly one region and thus the family of sets of players D = {Dj | j ∈ D} is a partition
of N. The set of all RL situations is denoted by Θ.
It is assumed that the nature of the resources is such that the players within the same
region can share resources with each other, i.e., all players within the same region
can benefit from a single resource. As a consequence, if a region contains at least
one player who owns a resource and all players in this region decide to cooperate,
then this resource can be donated to this region and so every player in this region has
access to a resource and thus receives its player-specific profit. Note that, due to the
nature of the resources, it does not make a difference for a region whether it has one,
or multiple players with a resource. Indeed, the remaining resources (if any) could
be allocated to other regions –and this calls for collaboration amongst the regions as
well. Doing this in an optimal way boils down to allocating the ∑i∈N ri resources to
the regions for which the regional profit, i.e., the sum of its player-specific profits, is
the highest. These regions are called the covered regions and the remaining ones are
called non-covered regons. We denote D cN ⊆ D as the set of covered regions. Then,
by assuming that initially there is no reallocation of resources and moreover resources
are not shared amongst players in the same region (i.e., no collaboration within and
4
amongst the regions), the maximal joint profit increase due to cooperation equals
∑
j∈D cN
∑
i∈Dj
wi − ∑
i∈N
riwi.
Here, the first part equals the sum of the regional profits of the covered regions, i.e.,
the total profit when there is full collaboration. The second part equals the sum of the
player-specific profits of the players who initially own a resource, i.e., the total profit
when there is no collaboration at all.
2.2 RL games
In this section, we introduce the associated RL game in order to tackle the allocation
problem of the maximal joint profit increase when players decide to collaborate. For
this, we start with a formal description of a cooperative game.
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v) where N denotes a non-empty, finite set of players
and v : 2N → R assigns a monetary payoff to each coalition S ⊆ N, where 2N denotes
the collection of all subsets of N. The coalitional value v(S) denotes the highest payoff
the coalition S can jointly generate by means of optimal cooperation without help of
players in N\S. Coalition N is called the grand coalition. Furthermore, by convention,
v(∅) = 0.
In order to define a cooperative game associated with RL situations, we first need to
introduce some notions and definitions. For each coalition S ⊆ N, R(S) indicates the
total number of resources in coalition S, i.e., R(S) = ∑i∈S ri. Additionally, for each
region j ∈ D , Dj(S) identifies the players of coalition S that belong to region j, i.e.,
Dj(S) = Dj ∩ S. The set DS ⊆ D contains the regions for which there exists a player of
coalition S that belongs to this region, i.e., DS = {j ∈ D | Dj(S) 6= ∅}. Moreover, we
denote the sum of the player-specific profits of all players in coalition S that belong to
region j by Wj(S) and thus Wj(S) = ∑i∈Dj(S) wi. We call Wj(S) the regional profit of
region j for coalition S.
To tackle the allocation problem of the maximal joint profit increase in an RL situation
θ = (N, r, w,D , D), one can analyze an associated cooperative game (N, vθ). Here, for a
coalition S ⊆ N\{∅}, vθ(S) reflects the maximal joint profit this coalition can make. For
this, we assume that the players in S can only reallocate their own resources. Moreover,
a player in coalition S cannot benefit from the resource of a player in the same region
if he does not belong to coalition S. As a consequence, it is optimal for coalition S
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to allocate his R(S) resources to the R(S) regions in DS for which the regional profits
for coalition S are the highest. In order to define vθ(S) formally, we first introduce
the bijection σS : {1, 2, . . . , |DS|} → DS. This bijection is uniquely defined and orders
the regions in DS in such a way that they are in non-increasing order with respect to
regional profits for coalition S. Moreover, if there is a tie, then the region with the
smallest index is chosen first. Formally,
σS(1) = min{j ∈ DS | Wj(S) ≥Wk(S) ∀k ∈ DS},
σS(i) = min
{
j ∈ DS\{σS(1), ..., σS(i-1)} | Wj(S) ≥Wk(S) ∀k ∈ DS\{σS(1), ..., σS(i-1)}
}
,
for every i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , |DS|}. As a result, coalition S allocates a resource to every
region j ∈ DS with σ−1S (j) ≤ R(S). We denote the set of covered regions for coalition
S by D cS = {j ∈ DS | σ−1S (j) ≤ R(S)} and the set of non-covered regions by DncS =
{j ∈ DS | σ−1S (j) > R(S)}. The following definition provides the formal definition of
an RL game.
Definition 1. For every RL situation θ ∈ Θ, the associated RL game (N, vθ) is defined by
vθ(S) = ∑
j∈D cS
Wj(S),
for all S ⊆ N\{∅} and vθ(∅) = 0.
We conclude this section with an illustrative example.
Example 1. Let θ ∈ Θ with N = {1, 2, 3}, r = (0, 0, 1), w = (10, 6, 8), D = {4, 5},
D4 = {1, 2}, and D5 = {3}. In Table 1, we present the coalitional values of (N, vθ).
S ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vθ(S) 0 0 0 8 0 10 8 16
Table 1: The RL game (N, vθ) of Example 1
Player 3 is the only player with a resource. When he cooperates with others, he can either keep
it in his own region, or give it to another region. Since w1 > w3 > w2, player 3 donates his
resource to region 4 when cooperating with player 1, but keeps it in region 5 when cooperating
with player 2. When all the players cooperate, it is best to allocate the resource to region 4.
Then, both player 1 and player 2 use it, which results in a profit of w1 + w2 = 10+ 6 = 16. 
3 The core of RL games
In this section, we study the core of RL games. We start with a formal description of
the core, a lemma for core allocations and a lemma that provides upper bounds for
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the coalitional values in RL games. Then, we focus in Section 3.1 on the core of RL
games that originate from RL situations with more resources than regions, i.e., with
oversupply of resources. Finally, we focus in Section 3.2 on the core of RL games that
originate from RL situations in which there are not more resources than regions, i.e.,
no oversupply of resources (so either undersupply or exactly enough resources).
The core C (N, v) of a cooperative game (N, v) is formally defined as the set of all
allocations x ∈ RN that are efficient (∑i∈N xi = v(N)) and stable (∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for
all S ⊂ N). In Lemma 1 we present a result for core allocations that is frequently used
throughout this paper. This lemma resembles that a coalition cannot claim too much
from the value of the grand coalition, because this would not leave enough for the
players outside the coalition. Recall that all proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 1. Let (N, v) be a cooperative game and let S ⊂ N. For every x ∈ C (N, v) it holds
that
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(N)− v(N\S).
In Lemma 2 we show that any coalition in an RL game can realize a coalitional value
at most equal to the sum of the player-specific profits of all the players in that coalition.
Moreover, in case there are enough resources for all regions of this coalition (i.e., no
undersupply of resources for coalition S), all player-specific profits can be realized.
Lemma 2. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. For any
coalition S ⊆ N, the following holds:
(i) vθ(S) ≤ ∑i∈S wi if R(S) < |DS|,
(ii) vθ(S) = ∑i∈S wi if R(S) ≥ |DS|.
Note that in case of oversupply of resources for the grand coalition, it is also possible
that there is no oversupply of resources for some coalitions. In other words, even
though we consider in Section 3.1 the case R(N) > |D |, it is still possible that there
exists a coalition S ⊂ N with R(S) ≤ |DS|.
3.1 Oversupply of resources: R(N) > |D |
In this section we describe (in Theorem 1) the core of RL games that originate from RL
situations with oversupply of resources. More precisely, in this case, the core coincides
with the vector of player-specific profits. We now provide a sketch of proof for this
first result. We start the proof of this theorem with showing that each core element
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can be written as the vector of player-specific profits. We do so by proving that each
player cannot claim more than its own profit, which follows by exploiting the results of
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Subsequently, by exploiting the efficiency property (of a core
allocation), we show that each player exactly claims its own profit. Finally, we prove
that the vector of player-specific profits is a core element. We do so by showing that
this vector is efficient and stable, which follows by exploiting the results of Lemma 2.
Theorem 1. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation with R(N) > |D | and let (N, vθ) be the associated
RL game. It holds that
C (N, vθ) = {w}.
This theorem shows that, in case of oversupply of resources, the value that players
assign to a resource reduces to zero and so all players obtain their player-specific profit.
3.2 No oversupply of resources: R(N) ≤ |D |
In this section we give (in Theorem 2) a partial description of the core of RL games
that originate from RL situations with no oversupply of resources. More precisely, we
introduce a (non-empty) set of intuitive core allocations. Moreover, we present (in
Theorem 3) a sufficient condition for which this set of intuitive core allocations
coincides with the core. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the
sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.
We start with introducing the intuitive core allocations, which per player i ∈ N,
consists of two components. The first component is the resource component γ · ri that
compensates for owning a resource. The second components is the profit component
αi that compensates for the profit realized by a player. The allocation, which we call a
Resoure-Profit (RP) allocation, is then formulated as
γ · ri + αi for all i ∈ N.
We continue by formally defining these two components. First, we introduce the
resource component, which depends on γ. This parameter is defined as follows:
γ ∈

[
WσN(R(N)+1)(N), WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) < |D |,[
0, WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) = |D |.
(1)
The parameter γ resembles the principle of a market price. Firstly, because γ is at
least equal to the regional profit of a region that has highest regional profit amongst
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all non-covered regions. Secondly, because γ is at most equal to the regional profit of
a region that has lowest regional profit amongst all covered regions. Hence, any other
price (than γ) would always give (some) players incentives to sell (or buy) a resource
for a lower (or higher) price. The profit component is defined as follows:
αi ∈
[0, wi] for all i ∈ Dj(N) with j ∈ D cN,{0} for all i ∈ Dj(N) with j ∈ DncN , (2)
with the additional condition that
∑
i∈Dj(N)
αi = Wj(N)− γ for all j ∈ D cN. (3)
So, players that belong to a covered region can divide the regional profit, minus the
price of the resource (that covers the region), freely, with the restriction that no one can
demand more than their player-specific profit.
Next, for every RL situation θ ∈ Θ, we denote the set of RP allocations by
Ωθ =
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣ xi = γ · ri + αi ∀i ∈ N, (1), (2), (3)} .
We are now ready to give a partial description of the core of RL games, i.e., ready
to show that RP allocations are core allocations. We prove this result (in Theorem 2)
by showing that every RP allocation is efficient and stable. Efficiency follows by the
construction of the resource and profit components in combination with the fact that
there is no oversupply of resources. For stability, we use that the sum of resource and
profit components of the players in a region exceeds the regional profit.
Theorem 2. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation for which R(N) ≤ |D | and let (N, vθ) be the
associated RL game. It holds that
Ωθ ⊆ C (N, vθ).
An interesting follow-up question is under which conditions (if any) every core
allocation can be described in terms of an RP allocation. In Theorem 3, we present a
sufficient condition under which this is true, i.e., a sufficient condition under which
the core coincides with the set of RP allocations. First, we introduce three relevant
lemmas that illustrate properties of core allocations in RL games.
The following lemma shows that players who do not own a resource themselves, can
claim only a limited share of the total profit.
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Lemma 3. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. Let i ∈ N
with ri = 0. Then, for any x ∈ C (N, vθ) it holds that
xi ∈
{0} if i ∈ Dj(N) for some j ∈ DncN ,[0, wi] if i ∈ Dj(N) for some j ∈ D cN.
For a cooperative game (N, v), we define a coalition S ⊆ N to be self-dual valued if
v(N) = v(S) + v(N\S).
By Lemma 1, self-dual valued coalitions cannot claim more than their own coalitional
value. Thus, by stability, they receive exactly their own coalitional value in every core
allocation, i.e., ∑i∈S xi = v(S) for every x ∈ C (N, v) and every self-dual valued
coalition S ⊆ N. In the following two lemmas we provide two examples of self-dual
valued coalitions in RL games.
Lemma 4. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. Let
J ⊆ D cN with ∑j∈J R(Dj(N)) = |J|. For any x ∈ C (N, vθ), it holds that
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi =∑
j∈J
Wj(N).
Lemma 5. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. Let
j ∈ D cN with R(Dj(N)) = 0. Moreover, let i ∈ Dl(N) for some l ∈ DncN with ri = 1. For any
x ∈ C (N, vθ), it holds that
xi + ∑
k∈Dj(N)
xk = Wj(N).
We are now ready to present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of RP
allocations coincide, namely the condition that each covered region has no more than
two players who initially have a resource. We now provide a sketch of proof for this
last result. We start the proof of this theorem by observing that, based on Theorem 2,
it suffices to show that the core is a subset of the set of RP allocations. In particular,
we do so by showing that every core allocation can be written as an RP allocation. For
that, we distinguish between two cases: the situation in which each covered region has
exactly one resource and the situation in which this is not the case. Then, per case, we
construct a resource component (γ) and a vector of profit components ((αi)i∈N) such
that they form a core allocation. Finally, we show that these components do satisfy the
properties of an RP allocation, i.e., the conditions in (1), (2) and (3).
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Theorem 3. Let θ ∈ Θ be a resource location situation with R(N) ≤ |D |, R(Dj(N)) ≤ 2 for
all j ∈ D cN and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. It holds that
Ωθ = C (N, vθ).
The condition in Theorem 3 resembles the idea that a covered region should have
limited bargaining power. We conclude this paper with an example, showing that
when the sufficient condition (of Theorem 3) is not sastisfied, i.e., when a covered
region has too much bargaining power, the set of RL allocations does not coincide with
the core.
Example 2. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, w = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), r =
(1, 1, 1, 0, 0), D = {6, 7, 8}, D6 = {1, 2, 3}, D7 = {4}, and D8 = {5}. In Table 2, we present
the coalitional values of RL game (N, vθ).
S vθ(S) S vθ(S) S vθ(S) S vθ(S)
∅ 0 {1, 4} 4 {1, 2, 3} 6 {2, 4, 5} 5
{1} 1 {1, 5} 5 {1, 2, 4} 7 {3, 4, 5} 5
{2} 2 {2, 3} 5 {1, 2, 5} 8 {1, 2, 3, 4} 10
{3} 3 {2, 4} 4 {1, 3, 4} 8 {1, 2, 3, 5} 11
{4} 0 {2, 5} 5 {1, 3, 5} 9 {1, 2, 4, 5} 9
{5} 0 {3, 4} 4 {1, 4, 5} 5 {1, 3, 4, 5} 9
{1, 2} 3 {3, 5} 5 {2, 3, 4} 9 {2, 3, 4, 5} 10
{1, 3} 4 {4, 5} 0 {2, 3, 5} 10 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 15
Table 2: The RL game (N, vθ) of Example 2
It can be checked that x = (5, 5, 5, 0, 0) ∈ C (N, vθ). Now, suppose that x ∈ Ωθ. So, for each
i ∈ N, we can write xi = γ · ri + αi. For i ∈ {4, 5} this boils down to α4 = x4 = 0 and α5 =
x5 = 0, because r4 = r5 = 0. Moreover, since x ∈ Ωθ, it holds that γ+∑i∈Dj(N) αi = Wj(N)
for all j ∈ D cN. So, for j = 7, this boils down to γ+ α4 = W7(N) = 4 and thus γ = 4. Now,
observe that γ+ α5 = 4 6= 5 = W8(N), which is a contradiction. Hence, x 6∈ Ωθ. 
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Appendix
Lemma 1. Let (N, v) be a cooperative game and let S ⊂ N. For every x ∈ C (N, v) it holds
that
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(N)− v(N\S).
Proof : Let x ∈ C (N, v). Then,
∑
i∈S
xi = ∑
i∈N
xi − ∑
i∈N\S
xi = v(N)− ∑
i∈N\S
xi ≤ v(N)− v(N\S),
where the second equality holds by efficiency and the inequality by stability. 
Lemma 2. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. For any
coalition S ⊆ N, the following holds:
(i) vθ(S) ≤ ∑i∈S wi if R(S) < |DS|,
(ii) vθ(S) = ∑i∈S wi if R(S) ≥ |DS|.
Proof : Let S ⊆ N. It holds that
vθ(S) = ∑
j∈D cS
Wj(S) ≤ ∑
j∈DS
Wj(S) = ∑
i∈S
wi,
where the inequality holds since D cS ⊆ DS and Wj(S) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ DS and all S ⊆ N.
Moreover, if R(S) ≥ |DS|, then coalition S has enough resources for covering all its
corresponding regions, i.e, all regions containing at least one player from coalition S.
As a consequence, D cS = DS and thus v
θ(S) = ∑i∈S wi. 
Theorem 1. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation with R(N) > |D | and let (N, vθ) be the associated
RL game. It holds that
C (N, vθ) = {w}.
Proof : (⊆) Let y ∈ C (N, vθ) and let i ∈ N. Since R(N) > |D | = |DN|, it follows from
Lemma 2(ii) that vθ(N) = ∑k∈N wk. Moreover, since ri ∈ {0, 1}, we have R(N\{i}) ≥
R(N)− 1 ≥ |D | ≥ |DN\{i}|. Hence, it also follows from Lemma 2(ii) that vθ(N\{i}) =
∑k∈N\{i} wk = ∑k∈N wk − wi = vθ(N) − wi. So, by Lemma 1, we have yi ≤ vθ(N) −
vθ(N\{i}) = wi. In order to satisfy efficiency, it is necessary to have yi = wi for all
i ∈ N. Hence, y = w and thus C (N, vθ) ⊆ {w}.
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(⊇) Since ∑i∈N wi = vθ(N), w is an efficient allocation. From Lemma 2 we also know
∑i∈S wi ≥ vθ(S) for every S ⊂ N. Hence, w is also a stable allocation and thus
w ∈ C (N, vθ). 
Theorem 2. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation for which R(N) ≤ |D | and let (N, vθ) be the
associated RL game. It holds that
Ωθ ⊆ C (N, vθ).
Proof : Let x ∈ Ωθ. We first show that x is an efficient allocation:
∑
i∈N
xi = γ · R(N) + ∑
j∈D cN
∑
i∈Dj(N)
αi + ∑
j∈DncN
∑
i∈Dj(N)
αi
= γ · R(N) + ∑
j∈D cN
(Wj(N)− γ) = ∑
j∈D cN
Wj(N) = vθ(N).
The second equality holds due to condition (3) and because αi = 0 for all i ∈ Dj(N)
with j ∈ DncN (condition (2)). In the third equality, it is explicitly used that there is no
oversupply of resources and thus the number of covered regions equals the number of
resources, i.e., |D cN| = R(N).
Secondly, we show that x is a stable allocation and thus let S ⊂ N. We first show that
γ+ ∑
i∈Dj(S)
αi ≥Wj(S) for all j ∈ D . (4)
For this, we distinguish between two cases: j ∈ D cN and j ∈ DncN .
- Case 1: j ∈ D cN.
Then,
γ+ ∑
i∈Dj(S)
αi = Wj(N)− ∑
i∈Dj(N\S)
αi = Wj(S) +Wj(N\S)− ∑
i∈Dj(N\S)
αi
= Wj(S) + ∑
i∈Dj(N\S)
(wi − αi) ≥Wj(S).
The first equality holds by condition (3) and the last inequality holds as αi ≤ wi for
all i ∈ N (condition (2)).
- Case 2: j ∈ DncN .
Since there are non-covered regions, it holds that R(N) < |D |. So,
γ+ ∑
i∈Dj(S)
αi ≥WσN(R(N)+1)(N) + ∑
i∈Dj(S)
αi ≥WσN(R(N)+1)(N) ≥Wj(N)
= ∑
i∈Dj(N)
wi ≥ ∑
i∈Dj(S)
wi = Wj(S).
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The first inequality holds because of condition (1) and the fact that R(N) < |D |.
The second inequality holds because αi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N (condition (2)). The third
inequality holds since every non-covered region has a regional profit at most equal
to the regional profit of the non-covered region with highest regional profit. The last
inequality holds since Dj(S) ⊆ Dj(N) and wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
We have proven that (4) holds, both if j ∈ D cN and if j ∈ DncN . Now, observe that
∑
i∈S
xi = γ · R(S) + ∑
j∈D
∑
i∈Dj(S)
αi ≥ γ · R(S) + ∑
j∈D cS
∑
i∈Dj(S)
αi
≥ γ · R(S) + ∑
j∈D cS
(Wj(S)− γ) = ∑
j∈D cS
Wj(S) = vθ(S).
The first inequality holds as D cS ⊆ D and αi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N (condition (2)). The
second inequality holds by applying (4). The penultimate equality holds since there is
no oversupply of resources for coalition S (because R(S) ≤ R(N) ≤ |D |) and thus the
number of covered regions for coalition S equals the number of resources of coalition
S, i.e., |D cS| = R(S).
Since x is both an efficient and stable allocation, we conclude that x ∈ C (N, vθ). 
Lemma 3. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. Let i ∈ N
with ri = 0. Then, for any x ∈ C (N, vθ) it holds that
xi ∈
{0} if i ∈ Dj(N) for some j ∈ DncN ,[0, wi] if i ∈ Dj(N) for some j ∈ D cN.
Proof : Let x ∈ C (N, vθ). Note that, since ri = 0, we have
R(N\{i}) = R(N)− ri = R(N),
i.e., coalition N\{i} and coalition N have the same number of resources. From now on
we distinguish between the two cases: i ∈ Dj(N) for some j ∈ DncN and i ∈ Dj(N) for
some j ∈ D cN.
- Case 1: i ∈ Dj(N) for some j ∈ DncN .
Since R(N\{i}) = R(N) and because player i is not in a covered region in the
optimal solution for the grand coalition, we know that the optimal allocation of
resources for coalition N\{i} is the same as the optimal allocation of resources for
the grand coalition. This means that also their coalitional values will be the same,
i.e., vθ(N\{i}) = vθ(N). Hence, by Lemma 1, we have
xi ≤ vθ(N)− vθ(N\{i}) = 0.
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Next, since ri = 0, we have vθ({i}) = 0. Hence, by stability, it holds that
xi ≥ v({i}) = 0.
Consequently, we have xi = 0.
- Case 2: i ∈ Dj(N) for some j ∈ D cN.
Since R(N\{i}) = R(N), the optimal allocation of resources for the grand coalition
is also a feasible allocation of resources for coalition N\{i}. This allocation results
in a profit of vθ(N) − wi for coalition N\{i}. However, in contrast to case 1, this
allocation is not necessarily optimal (because player i is in a covered region in the
optimal solution for the grand coalition). Therefore, vθ(N\{i}) ≥ vθ(N)−wi. Hence,
by Lemma 1, we have
xi ≤ vθ(N)− vθ(N\{i}) ≤ wi.
Similar to case 1 we have due to stability xi ≥ 0 and thus xi ∈ [0, wi]. 
Lemma 4. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. Let
J ⊆ D cN with ∑j∈J R(Dj(N)) = |J|. For any x ∈ C (N, vθ), it holds that
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi =∑
j∈J
Wj(N).
Proof : We prove this lemma by first showing vθ(∪j∈J Dj(N)) = ∑j∈J Wj(N) and then
showing that coalition ∪j∈J Dj(N) is self-dual valued. Firstly, since R(∪j∈J Dj(N)) =
∑j∈J R(Dj(N)) = |J|, it follows from Lemma 2(ii) that vθ(∪j∈J Dj(N)) = ∑j∈J Wj(N).
Secondly, note that coalition N\ (∪j∈J Dj(N)) has R(N)− |J| resources and thus it still
has exactly enough resources to cover all regions in D cN\J (because J ⊆ D cN and thus
|D cN\J| = |D cN| − |J| = R(N)− |J|). As a consequence,
vθ(N\ (∪j∈J Dj(N))) = ∑
j∈D cN\J
Wj(N) = ∑
j∈D cN
Wj(N)−∑
j∈J
Wj(N)
= vθ(N)− vθ(∪j∈J Dj(N)).
Hence, coalition ∪j∈J Dj(N) is self-dual valued which finishes the proof. 
Lemma 5. Let θ ∈ Θ be an RL situation and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. Let
j ∈ D cN with R(Dj(N)) = 0. Moreover, let i ∈ Dl(N) for some l ∈ DncN with ri = 1. For any
x ∈ C (N, vθ), it holds that
xi + ∑
k∈Dj(N)
xk = Wj(N).
Proof : Similar to the proof of Lemma 4, we prove this lemma by first showing
vθ(Dj(N) ∪ {i}) = Wj(N) and then showing that coalition Dj(N) ∪ {i} is self-dual
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valued. Firstly, note that coalition Dj(N) ∪ {i} has a single resource because
R(Dj(N)) = 0 and ri = 1. Moreover, since region j is a covered region and player i is
in the non-covered region l, we know Wj(N) ≥ Wl(N) ≥ wi. As a consequence,
coalition Dj(N) ∪ {i} will cover region j with its single resource and thus
vθ(Dj(N) ∪ {i}) = Wj(N). Secondly, note that coalition N\(Dj(N) ∪ {i}) has
R(N)− 1 resources and thus it still has exactly enough resources to cover all regions
in D cN\{j} (because j ∈ D cN and thus |D cN\{j}| = |D cN| − 1 = R(N) − 1). As a
consequence,
vθ(N\ (Dj(N) ∪ {i})) = ∑
k∈D cN\{j}
Wk(N) = ∑
k∈D cN
Wk(N)−Wj(N)
= vθ(N)− vθ(Dj(N) ∪ {i}).
Hence, coalition Dj(N) ∪ {i} is self-dual valued which finishes the proof. 
Theorem 3. Let θ ∈ Θ be a resource location situation with R(N) ≤ |D |, R(Dj(N)) ≤ 2 for
all j ∈ D cN and let (N, vθ) be the associated RL game. It holds that
Ωθ = C (N, vθ).
Proof : From Theorem 2 we already know that Ωθ ⊆ C (N, vθ), so we only need to
prove C (N, vθ) ⊆ Ωθ, i.e., we need to prove that every core allocation can be written as
an RP allocation. For this, let x ∈ C (N, vθ) and we will show that there exists a γ and
a set (αi)i∈N for which the following five properties hold:
a) xi = γ · ri + αi for all i ∈ N,
b) αi = 0 for all i ∈ Dj(N) and all j ∈ DncN ,
c) αi ∈ [0, wi] for all i ∈ Dj(N) and all j ∈ D cN,
d) γ+∑i∈Dj(N) αi = Wj(N) for all j ∈ D cN,
e) γ ∈

[
WσN(R(N)+1)(N), WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) < |D |,[
0, WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) = |D |.
Note that these five properties together imply that x belongs to the set of RP allocations.
From now on we distinguish between two cases: in case 1 we assume that each covered
region initially has exactly one resource and in case 2 we assume that this is not the
case.
Case 1: R(Dj(N)) = 1 for all j ∈ D cN.
Before proving that the five properties are satisfied, we will first show that every player
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in a non-covered region initially has no resources. Since there is no oversupply of
resources, the number of covered regions equals the number of resources, i.e., |D cN| =
R(N). Therefore, since R(Dj(N)) = 1 for all j ∈ D cN, it follows that ∑j∈D cN R(Dj(N)) =
|D cN| = R(N). Using this relationship, it follows that ∑j∈DncN R(Dj(N)) = R(N)−
∑j∈D cN R(Dj(N)) = R(N)− R(N) = 0. As a consequence, R(Dj(N)) = 0 for all j ∈ DncN ,
i.e., each non-covered region initially has no resources. Specifically, every player in a
non-covered region initially has no resources, i.e., ri = 0 for all i ∈ Dj(N) with j ∈ DncN .
Now, we set
γ = min{xk | k ∈ N, rk = 1},
αi = xi − γ · ri for all i ∈ N,
and we will prove that the five properties are satisfied.
a) We need to prove xi = γ · ri + αi for all i ∈ N. This property follows automatically
by construction of γ and (αi)i∈N.
b) We need to prove αi = 0 for all i ∈ Dj(N) and all j ∈ DncN . For this, let j ∈ DncN and
i ∈ Dj(N). Since ri = 0, it follows from Lemma 3 that αi = xi − γ · ri = xi = 0.
c) We need to prove αi ∈ [0, wi] for all i ∈ Dj(N) and all j ∈ D cN. For this, let j ∈ D cN
and i ∈ Dj(N). We distinguish between two cases: ri = 0 and ri = 1.
- Case 1.c.1: ri = 0.
By Lemma 3, we have that αi = xi − γ · ri = xi ∈ [0, wi].
- Case 1.c.2: ri = 1.
We distinguish between another two cases: xi = γ and xi 6= γ.
- Case 1.c.2.1: xi = γ.
It holds that αi = xi − γ = γ− γ = 0 ∈ [0, wi].
- Case 1.c.2.2: xi 6= γ.
Let i∗ ∈ {k ∈ N | xk = γ and rk = 1}, then i 6= i∗. Note that region Dj(N) owns
in total one resource (as j ∈ D cN). Therefore, since i ∈ Dj(N) with ri = 1, there
is no other player with a resource in this region. Hence, since ri∗ = 1, we know
that i∗ 6∈ Dj(N). Now, it holds that
xi∗ − xi + ∑
k∈Dj(N)
xk ≥ vθ(Dj(N)\{i} ∪ {i∗}) ≥Wj(N)− wi, (5)
where the first inequality holds by stability. The second inequality holds since
coalition Dj(N)\{i} ∪ {i∗} has one resource, which, as a possible allocation, can
be positioned in region j. By Lemma 4 we have ∑i∈Dj(N) xi = Wj(N) and thus
from (5) it follows that xi∗ − xi ≥ −wi. Hence,
αi = xi − γ = xi − xi∗ ≤ wi.
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Moreover,
αi = xi − γ = xi −min{xk | k ∈ N, rk = 1} ≥ 0,
where the inequality holds as i ∈ {k ∈ N | rk = 1}. Consequently, αi ∈ [0, wi].
d) We need to prove γ+ ∑i∈Dj(N) αi = Wj(N) for all j ∈ D cN. For this, let j ∈ D cN. In
addition, let i∗ ∈ Dj(N) for which ri∗ = 1. Note that i∗ is unique since R(Dj(N)) = 1.
From this, we can conclude that
γ+ ∑
i∈Dj(N)
αi = γ+ αi∗ + ∑
i∈Dj(N)\{i∗}
αi = xi∗ + ∑
i∈Dj(N)\{i∗}
xi = ∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi = Wj(N),
where the last equality holds by Lemma 4, because R(Dj(N)) = 1.
e) We need to prove γ ∈

[
WσN(R(N)+1)(N), WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) < |D |,[
0, WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) = |D |.
For this, we distinguish between two cases: R(N) = |D | and R(N) < |D |.
- Case 1.e.1: R(N) = |D |.
From property d) we know that γ + ∑i∈DσN (R(N))(N) αi = WσN(R(N))(N). This
implies that
γ ≤WσN(R(N))(N),
because αi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ DσN(R(N))(N) by property c). Next, let
i∗ ∈ {k ∈ N | xk = γ and rk = 1}. Note that i∗ exists due to the definition of γ.
Then, by stability and the fact that ri∗ = 1, we have
γ = xi∗ ≥ vθ({i∗}) = wi∗ ≥ 0.
Hence, γ ∈ [0, WσN(R(N))(N)].
- Case 1.e.2: R(N) < |D |.
Similar to case 1.e.1, it follows that
γ ≤WσN(R(N))(N).
Again, let i∗ ∈ {k ∈ N|xk = γ and rk = 1}. Observe that i∗ 6∈ DσN(R(N)+1)(N)
since ri∗ = 1 and R(DσN(R(N)+1)(N)) = 0. Then,
xi∗ + ∑
i∈DσN (R(N)+1)(N)
xi ≥ vθ(DσN(R(N)+1)(N) ∪ {i∗}) ≥WσN(R(N)+1)(N),
where the first inequality holds by stability and the second inequality since
allocating the single resource to region σN(R(N) + 1) is a possible allocation for
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coalition DσN(R(N)+1)(N) ∪ {i∗}. By Lemma 3 and because ri = 0 for all
i ∈ DσN(R(N)+1)(N), we have xi = 0 for all i ∈ DσN(R(N)+1)(N). Hence,
γ = xi∗ ≥WσN(R(N)+1)(N)− ∑
i∈DσN (R(N)+1)(N)
xi = WσN(R(N)+1)(N).
Hence, γ ∈ [WσN(R(N)+1)(N), WσN(R(N))(N)].
Case 2: there exists a j ∈ D cN for which R(Dj(N)) 6= 1.
Before proving that the five properties are satisfied, we will first show that there exists
a covered region that initially has no resources. For this, suppose for the sake of
contradiction that this is not the case. Then, since there exists a j ∈ D cN for which
R(Dj(N)) 6= 1, we know that this covered region initially has exactly two resources.
Moreover, every other covered regions initially has at least one resource. Consequently,
R(N) ≥ ∑j∈D cN R(Dj(N)) ≥ |D cN| + 1 = R(N) + 1 > R(N), which is a contradiction
and thus there indeed exists a covered region that initially has no resources. Let j0
denote such a region, i.e., let j0 ∈ D cN with R(Dj0(N)) = 0. Now, we set
γ = Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi,
αi = xi − γ · ri for all i ∈ N,
and we will prove that the five properties are satisfied.
a) Similar to property a) in case 1, we can conclude xi = γ · ri + αi for all i ∈ N.
b) We need to prove αi = 0 for all i ∈ Dj(N) and all j ∈ DncN . For this, let j ∈ DncN and
i ∈ Dj(N). We distinguish between two cases: ri = 0 and ri = 1.
- Case 2.b.1: ri = 0.
Similar to property b) in case 1, we can conclude αi = 0.
- Case 2.b.2: ri = 1.
By Lemma 5, we have αi = xi − γ = xi +∑i∈Dj0 (N) xi −Wj0(N) = 0.
c) We need to prove αi ∈ [0, wi] for all i ∈ Dj(N) and all j ∈ D cN. For this, let j ∈ D cN
and i ∈ Dj(N). We distinguish between two cases: ri = 0 and ri = 1.
- Case 2.c.1: ri = 0.
Similar to property c) in case 1.c.1., we can conclude αi ∈ [0, wi].
- Case 2.c.2: ri = 1.
Since R(Dj0(N)) = 0 and thus every players in region j0 initially has no resources,
we have i 6∈ Dj0(N). Moreover, as R(N\(Dj0(N) ∪ {i})) = R(N) − 1, we know
that coalition N\(Dj0(N) ∪ {i}) has exactly enough resources to cover all regions
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in D cN\{j0} (because j0 ∈ D cN and thus |D cN\{j0}| = |D cN| − 1 = R(N)− 1). This
allocation results in a profit of vθ(N)−Wj0(N)−wi for coalition N\(Dj0(N)∪{i}).
Note that this allocation is not necessarily optimal and thus
vθ(N\(Dj0(N) ∪ {i})) ≥ vθ(N)−Wj0(N)− wi.
As a consequence,
αi = xi − γ = ∑
k∈Dj0 (N)∪{i}
xk −Wj0(N) ≤ vθ(N)− vθ(N\(Dj0(N) ∪ {i}))−Wj0(N)
≤ vθ(N)−
(
vθ(N)−Wj0(N)− wi
)
−Wj0(N) = wi,
where the first inequality holds by applying Lemma 1. Next, observe that
αi = xi − γ = ∑
k∈Dj0 (N)∪{i}
xk −Wj0(N) ≥ vθ(Dj0(N) ∪ {i})−Wj0(N)
≥Wj0(N)−Wj0(N) = 0,
where the first inequality holds by stability and the second inequality since
allocating the single resource to region j0 is a possible allocation for coalition
Dj0(N) ∪ {i}. Consequently, αi ∈ [0, wi].
d) We need to prove γ+∑i∈Dj(N) αi = Wj(N) for all j ∈ D cN. For this, let j ∈ D cN. We
distinguish between three cases: R(Dj(N)) = 0, R(Dj(N)) = 1 and R(Dj(N)) = 2.
- Case 2.d.1: R(Dj(N)) = 0.
We distinguish between another two cases: in the first case we assume that there is
a covered region that initially has two resources and in the second case we assume
that this is not the case.
- Case 2.d.1.1: there exists a j ∈ D cN for which R(Dj(N)) = 2.
Let j2 ∈ D cN with R(Dj2(N)) = 2. By Lemma 4, it holds that
∑
i∈Dj2 (N)∪Dj0 (N)
xi = Wj2(N) +Wj0(N),
∑
i∈Dj2 (N)∪Dj(N)
xi = Wj2(N) +Wj(N).
Subtracting the first equality from the second equality gives
∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi − ∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi = Wj0(N)−Wj(N). (6)
As a consequence, since ri = 0 and thus αi = xi for all i ∈ Dj0(N), we have
γ+ ∑
i∈Dj(N)
αi = Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi + ∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi = Wj(N).
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- Case 2.d.1.2: R(Dj(N)) 6= 2 for all j ∈ D cN.
In this case we have that every covered region initially has at most one resource.
Moreover, since the covered region j0 initially has no resources, we know that
there must be a player in a non-covered region that initially has a resource. Let
i∗ denote such a player, i.e., let i∗ ∈ Dj′(N) for some j′ ∈ DncN with ri∗ = 1. Then,
by Lemma 5, it holds that
xi∗ + ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi = Wj0(N),
xi∗ + ∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi = Wj(N).
Subtracting the first equality from the second equality again gives (6). As a
consequence, similar to case 2.d.1.1, we can conclude γ+∑i∈Dj(N) αi = Wj(N).
- Case 2.d.2: R(Dj(N)) = 1.
Similar to property d) in case 1, we can conclude γ+∑i∈Dj(N) αi = Wj(N).
- Case 2.d.3: R(Dj(N)) = 2.
Let i1, i2 ∈ Dj(N) with i1 6= i2 and ri1 = ri2 = 1. Then, for each i ∈ Dj(N)\{i1, i2},
we have ri = 0 and thus αi = xi. As a consequence,
γ+ ∑
i∈Dj(N)
αi = γ+ (xi1 − γ) + (xi2 − γ) + ∑
i∈Dj(N)\{i1,i2}
xi = ∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi − γ
= ∑
i∈Dj(N)
xi −
Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi

=
Wj(N)−Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi
−
Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi

= Wj(N),
where the penultimate equality is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.
e) We need to prove γ ∈

[
WσN(R(N)+1)(N), WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) < |D |,[
0, WσN(R(N))(N)
]
if R(N) = |D |.
For this, we distinguish between two cases: R(N) = |D | and R(N) < |D |.
- Case 2.e.1: R(N) = |D |.
Similar to case 1.e.1, it follows that
γ ≤WσN(R(N))(N).
In addition, by Lemma 3, xi ≤ wi for all i ∈ Dj0(N) and thus
γ = Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi ≥Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
wi = Wj0(N)−Wj0(N) = 0.
22
Hence, γ ∈ [0, WσN(R(N))(N)].
- Case 2.e.2: R(N) < |D |.
Similar to case 1.e.1, it follows that
γ ≤WσN(R(N))(N).
Next, since R(N\Dj0(N)) = R(N), we know that coalition N\Dj0(N) has exactly
enough resources to cover all regions in D cN\{j0} ∪ {σN(R(N) + 1)} (because j0 ∈
D cN and σN(R(N) + 1) 6∈ D cN and thus |D cN\{j0} ∪ {σN(R(N) + 1)}| = |D cN| =
R(N)). This allocation results in a profit of vθ(N)−Wj0(N) +WσN(R(N)+1)(N) for
coalition N\Dj0(N). Hence,
vθ(N\Dj0(N)) ≥ vθ(N)−Wj0(N) +WσN(R(N)+1)(N).
Consequently, by Lemma 1, we have
γ = Wj0(N)− ∑
i∈Dj0 (N)
xi ≥Wj0(N)− vθ(N) + vθ(N\Dj0(N))
≥Wj0(N)− vθ(N) +
(
vθ(N)−Wj0(N) +WσN(R(N)+1)(N)
)
= WσN(R(N)+1)(N).
To conclude, γ ∈ [WσN(R(N)+1)(N), WσN(R(N))(N)].
We have proven that every core allocation can be written as an RP allocation, both if
R(Dj(N)) = 1 for all j ∈ D cN (case 1) and if there exists a j ∈ D cN for which
R(Dj(N)) 6= 1 (case 2). Hence, the set of RP allocations concides with the core. 
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